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Abstract 
This paper looks at the relationship between trade openness and an exchange rate volatility index 
called exchange market pressure. The theory behind the paper is that increasing trade flows 
between nations should reduce economic volatility, as it allows for the correct allocation of 
goods and services across borders. The results show a negative relationship between an increase 
in trade openness and volatility as measured by exchange market pressures. The empirical 
estimate is based on 20 OECD nations from 1992 to 2007. Although, trade shows some impact 
on volatility, most instability arises from systematic risks that are felt globally. 
1 
 
I. Introduction  
The World Trade Organization (2012) recognizes 511 regional trade agreements by 157 
nations, evidence of the growing importance of trade in maximizing global output and mitigating 
economic volatility. By increasing trade across borders, nations will raise welfare and reduce 
volatility. At least, that is the goal of international trade organizations such as the WTO and the 
reason for the promotion of trade agreements. However, according to a study by Aart Kraay at 
the World Bank, there were a total of 30 speculative attacks on currencies, in the 1990’s alone.1 
The prevalence of volatility, even with more integrated financial economies, lends itself to 
important questions surrounding what, in fact, will reduce instability and create manageable 
business cycles. Victims of instability in the past two decades include developing countries 
accessing world markets for the first time such as South Korea in 1997, as well as highly 
developed and globalized nations like Great Britain, as recently as 1992. Nevertheless, countries 
continue to enter trade agreements and move towards currency unions to improve access to 
capital markets and promote the correct allocation of goods and services across borders. This 
paper attempts to isolate whether the increasing attention placed on trade agreements aids in 
reducing a nation’s volatility. 
Trade theory suggests that greater integration dilutes abrupt changes in a nation’s business 
cycle, rooted in the notion that moving away from autarkic protection improves a nation’s trade 
basket, and creates a larger pie for all parties involved. The goal of integration is not only to 
increase growth, but also to reduce volatility of business cycles by creating more stable inflation 
rates, unemployment rates, government debt levels, tariff rates and price parity by allowing for 
                                                          
1
 Speculative attacks are the massive selling of a currency on a foreign exchange market, which leads to a 
currency’s rapid depreciation. The mechanics of such attacks are explained in the literature review. 
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the correct allocation of factors of production between borders. By globalizing, nations have 
access to more and cheaper liquidity and hedging opportunities to dampen cycles.  
To understand the relationship between trade and volatility, this paper looks at instability in 
terms of balance of payment (BOP) and currency crises, which are both forms of exchange rate 
volatility, and attempts to identify the effect of trade transformation on the two crises. Currency 
crises are the immediate change in a currency valuation that alters the supply and demand of an 
individual country’s output. Balance of payment crises are a nation’s inability to reconcile trade 
debts leading to the devaluation of its currency. Nations experiencing either type of crises 
observe a sizeable increase in its nominal exchange rate. The traditional literature on exchange 
rate volatility focuses on capital flows in creating the majority of currency crises.
2
 This paper 
analyzes trade openness, as one of many factors that influence currency and balance of payment 
crises, in addition to other variables which aid in creating asymmetric shocks between similar 
countries.
3
 This includes national debt, inflation, gross domestic product per capita and 
unemployment. Asymmetric shocks occur when markets experience varying supply and demand 
equlibria from one region to another. By bridging the gap between asymmetries, countries will 
be able to adjust quicker towards equilibrium, and prevent future imbalances as economies will 
embody harmonized policy measures.
4
 
                                                          
2
The first major increases in currency crises occurred in 1960’s and were caused by investors moving their portfolio 
positions to attractive investments in developing countries. This put some nations into consecutive fiscal deficits, 
creating increased currency susceptibility to crises.  Nations saw depreciations due to changes in the valuation of 
their currency. The literature review will delve further into topics that cause crises in addition to excessive capital 
flows to developing countries. 
3
 Trade openness is measured by the summation of exports and imports as a ratio of GDP. Trade openness can be 
changed by growth in goods and services within a nation as well as influenced by trade partners. Therefore, it has 
the capacity to impact a nation’s ability to correctly allocate goods and services. 
4
 In the Euro Zone, harmonized policies have taken the form of a single central bank that sets monetary policy for all 
nations, identical trade policies in partners, tariff levels and rules of origin rates, and the agreement of the Maastricht 
Convergence Criteria which forced participating countries to match an inflation rate, deficit rate and debt to GDP 
level. By harmonizing such policies, the Euro Zone hopes to achieve monetary gains through integrative efficiencies. 
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Understanding the relationship between trade and exchange rate volatility provides decision 
tools for nations focusing on greater trade liberalization. This generates policy implications for 
whether a nation enters into free and regional trade agreements, as well as joins currency unions, 
such as the Euro Zone. The success of the Euro Zone could lead to South American countries 
participating in Mercosur to create a common currency.
5
 It also explains the uncertainties of 
nations to join trade agreements, as is the case with Japan and its hesitation to join the Trans-
Pacific Partnership. If trade is effective in reducing volatility in financial markets, then more 
nations will engage in the globalization trend.  
Nations referencing recent trade agreements will find it difficult to fully understand the 
impact of integration on stability. Volatility and its causes remain prevalent as portrayed by the 
presence of speculative attacks on currencies even with increased trade liberalization, as well as 
varying inflationary and debt levels between similar countries. Haddad et al (2010) argues that 
openness may have a positive or negative effect on economic growth volatility depending on 
trade baskets. The recent entrance of a handful of developing nations into large trade agreements 
reinvigorated the need to look at this relationship. The nations of the European Union actively 
participate in well over 30 regional trade agreements, while emerging economies have expanded 
their trade partners rapidly in the past decade. However, agreements in the recent past show both 
positive and negative outcomes. Shortly after Mexico signed the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, it suffered a currency crisis in 1995. Although the results of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
However, not all nations within the currency union have been able to synthesize policies creating problems for the 
Euro Zone and its ability to provide cohesive stability. For example, Greece, Italy and Spain have been unable to 
harmonize their debt to GDP ratios, leading to larger shocks in those nations than other Euro Zone nations. This 
makes a single monetary policy for all Euro Zone nations ineffective in curtailing excessive shocks in troubled 
nations, without negatively impacting more stable countries. 
5
 Mercosur is made-up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. The nations have already reduced 
trade tariffs and harmonized many trade partners, much like the Euro Zone nations did on the way to their currency 
union. The nations of Mercosur have been plagued by a myriad of currency and balance of payment crises in recent 
decades. 
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NAFTA in changing tariffs and causing adjustments to capital flows took years to realize, 
sentiment over stability can change immediately. Garber and Flood (1984) introduced second 
generation crises which argue that volatility can be caused by sentiment changes.
6
 Trade 
agreements represent the momentum to provide such sentiment changes if investors believe trade 
will lead to depreciation in order to increase competitiveness. Another example of a 
liberalization crisis is the East Asian Tigers, who opened their economies in the 1990’s and 
experienced a crisis in 1997. Mexico’s situation is unique but is growing in importance as they 
engaged in devaluation to increase competitiveness. Other developing countries may follow suit. 
The different examples include currency crises and balance of payment crises, but both see 
immediate changes in nominal exchange rates. Economists continue to argue over whether 
Mexico should have agreed to engage in a free trade agreement with the United States. Some are 
not convinced that the integration provided Mexico with additional stability. 
Past research uses varying methods to analyze a country’s exchange rate volatility. This 
paper assesses a nation’s volatility based on a variable developed by Eichengreen et al (1994, 
1995) that incorporates exchange rate movements, interest rate spreads and international reserves 
called exchange market pressure (EMP). Studies focusing on volatility often only look at 
movements in a nation’s exchange rate. EMP takes into account exchange rate movements, but 
also interest rate and international reserve changes which are commonly associated with 
volatility. The model in this paper concentrates on causes of exchange market pressures as a 
result of economic variables studied in past research including national debt, inflation, GDP per 
                                                          
6
 Sentiment crises involve an investor’s expectation that currency devaluation may occur in the future because of 
economic weaknesses. This may include high levels of inflation and debt levels, both of which will be tested in this 
model. Under this presumption, investors will engage in capital flight, or the selling of domestic currency, leading to 
devaluation. Mexico engaged in devaluation to create export competitiveness, which investors took note of and 
created a crisis that the Mexican government could not control with policy measures. Trade has the ability to trigger 
a sentiment change if investors question a nation’s trade balance or that of a trade partner. 
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capita and unemployment rates (all factors that can lead to instability), but also expands into 
trade parameters that affect pressures.  Using exchange market pressures allows for an analysis 
of all types of movements including devaluations, sentiment changes and speculative attacks, 
because each type of volatility is amassed in the exchange rate, interest rate and international 
reserves variables. 
This paper first introduces the literature relevant to currency crises, trade openness and their 
interaction. Next, the model uses panel data to show the effect of macroeconomic events, in 
particular trade events, on Eichengreen et al’s (1994, 1995) exchange market pressure. The 
results will assist policy makers on how trade can be adjusted to provide financial stabilization, 
and whether entering trade agreements and currency unions rightly assists in the mitigation of 
asymmetric shocks and validates the mission of the World Trade Organization. 
II. Literature Review 
Volatility is often identified through the analysis of currency and balance of payment crises. 
Therefore, it is necessary to explore the history of exchange rate crises and investigate how 
recent research looks at some of the factors that may influence this instability. 
 After the fall of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 1973, nations moved from a 
fixed exchange rate on gold to floating rates. This increased the attention of monetary policy on 
volatility of economies in response to shocks. Monetary policy was used as preemption to capital 
flights that created risks of currency devaluations. Large variations in exchange rate volatility 
reinvigorated Robert Mundell’s (1961) thesis on optimum currency areas. He argues that trade 
zones act as a stabilizer for exchange rate fluctuations, signifying a need for greater regional 
integration, with the formation of single currency areas as an extreme, in order to reduce 
6 
 
business cycles.
7
 Mundell was one of the first proponents for creating a single currency in the 
European region. This currency area he labels as an optimum currency area, or an integrated 
region that reaps the benefits of a single monetary unit by harmonizing business cycles and 
allowing for the free movement of factors of production. He argues that integration alleviates 
exchange rate crises, while also reducing asymmetric shocks and aiding in consistent growth 
because labor and other factors of production can correctly move to where they are most efficient. 
Lane (2000) argues that asymmetric shocks are the main cause of exchange rate movements. 
Mundell shows that harmonized regions would see these economic variables move together 
allowing for rule based policy to alleviate abrupt cycles. Rules include inflation rate rules to keep 
rates at low, consistent amounts, tariff regulations, and fiscal policy mandates. As described 
before, the Euro Zone created the Maastricht Criteria to ensure these main factors that lead to 
asymmetric shocks were held at synchronized rates.
8
   
The argument for capital and trade mobility to create a harmonized economy subsided until 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System. Nations began experiencing varying exchange rate 
pressures, became more susceptible to balance of payment crises and ultimately turned to 
monetary policy to provide stability. Volatility did arise in the late 1960’s and early 70’s under 
                                                          
7
 Exchange rates are often the mechanism that adjusts when there are asymmetries between economies. For example, 
disequilibrium between nations in inflation rates, debt levels and trade balances are put into parity through exchange 
rates, allowing their movements to be used as a measure of economic crisis. 
8
 According to the Maastricht Convergence Criteria as outlined by the European Commission, European members 
that wish to join the Euro Zone must consent to the following four criteria: 
1. “An average rate of inflation that does not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points that of the three best-
performing Member States in terms of price stability for a period of one year before the examination. 
2. Government deficit to gross domestic product should be no more than 3%, and their ratio of (general) 
government debt to GDP should be no more than 60%. 
3. Respect the normal fluctuation margins of the exchange rate mechanism without severe tensions for at least 
the two years before the examination. 
4. Had an average nominal long-term interest rate over a period of one year before the examination that does 
not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of the three best-performing Member States in terms of 
price stability.” 
Despite such constraints, many nations within the Euro Zone fail to meet the guidelines, which explains part of the 
determination of asymmetric shocks. 
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the Bretton Woods System as speculators began to increase investments in developing nations 
which created large capital flow movements. This put countries into consecutive fiscal deficits 
and called for sterilization policies, which drained foreign reserves. Sterilization policies are 
open market operations used to offset changes in foreign asset accounts. As foreign reserves fall, 
central governments increase domestic currency supplies to prevent currency depreciations. Such 
policies began the possibilities of balance of payment crises according to Krugman et al (2008). 
This is because investors know a government will need to sell their foreign reserves, which will 
depreciate the currency, so to prevent a suboptimal position, investors sell all domestic assets 
immediately.  
Rudiger Dornbusch (1976) amended the Mundell-Fleming Model to show that nominal 
exchange rates over depreciate in the short run and then appreciate to a still depreciated level in 
the long run.
9
 This model proved useful in providing the initial explanation for exchange rate 
volatility in the adjustment to floating rates.  It demonstrated that financial markets adjust rapidly, 
while the goods market incurred sticky prices.  Calderon (2004) noting the work of Dornbusch, 
shows how the impact of monetary stability on exchange rates provides an initial explanation of 
currency movements, but still lacks a full understanding of the volatility.  
Krugman (1979) provides an initial theoretical framework to explain currency crises. He 
posits that at a pegged exchange rate, a government’s international reserves (also known as 
foreign exchange reserves) will begin to fall, and at a point well before the exhaustion of 
reserves, there is a sudden speculative attack that causes full depletion.  The psychology behind a 
first generation crisis hinges on the expectation that a central government will defend its 
                                                          
9
 The Mundell-Fleming Model assumes prices to be sticky in the short run. Dornbusch relaxes this assumption and 
finds that financial markets react immediately to exogenous shocks. 
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currency at the current rate by undergoing an expansionary monetary policy. This signals to 
investors the potential for depreciation of the currency and in turn their current position in the 
market. Krugman’s model correctly incorporates international reserves in explaining 
depreciations, and provides a starting point to define a crisis, especially those in the 1970’s after 
the fall of the Bretton Woods System. Crises at this time centered more on initial financial 
speculation and the movement of capital between countries where investors looked to maximize 
their positions on investments in developing countries.  
Garber and Flood (1984) explored the intuition behind second-generation currency crisis 
models which focus on how expectations of a crisis can lead to the defense of the currency by the 
central government. In this model, multiple equilibria force a central government to decide 
whether to attempt a defense which would entail increasing the money supply, or abandoning the 
peg to allow for a free floating exchange rate at the shadow rate.  The shadow exchange rate is 
the rate that would prevail if the government used a floating exchange rate and allowed for no 
foreign exchange market intervention. Thus, when the peg is abandoned, a country moves to its 
shadow rate. A government must weigh the costs and benefits of defense or peg abandonment, 
where defense may temporarily work, but fail during the next attack. Eichengreen et al (1994) 
suggest this model set the stage for identifying different factors that may be the reason for the 
attack or not.  This model caused future research to focus on whether other factors such as 
contagion, terms of trade changes, trade as percentage of output, leadership switches and other 
events affect the government’s decision to try to defend the currency or allow for a speculative 
attack.
10
 In the case of trade liberalization, some nations allow for the controlled depreciations 
                                                          
10
 See footnote 6 for a detailed explanation of how exogenous factors affect sentiment with regards to a nation’s 
currency. 
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(in lieu of an attack) to promote growth. Thus, the model suggests focusing on factors such as 
national debt or trade parameters to help explain the cause of a self-fulfilling currency crisis.
11
  
Recent literature identifies a chasm between researchers who believe output, growth, money 
supply, contagion, employment, fiscal policy and many other factors are effective in providing 
more information about crises and those who argue the variables are too endogenous to make 
robust claims. Obstfeld (1994) analyzes the appropriateness of attributing said factors to the 
causes of currency crises. He contends that it is difficult to bridge comparisons between different 
currency crises due to varying market expectations. Furthermore, the endogenous attributes of 
the variables that cause crises make it difficult to ascribe the cause to specific events or 
expectations. Feridun (2007) argues that crisis predictions and early warning systems may be 
unattainable because of multiple equilibria based on market sentiments.
12
 He asserts that faulty 
models try to identify specific factors instead of inherent weaknesses.  Furthermore, much 
research looks into whether a government entertains a controlled devaluation, as in the case of 
Mexico in 1995, as preemption to a self-fulfilling crisis. Devaluation increases a nation’s trade 
balance and potentially restores confidence in the currency rate.  
Other researchers believe monetary, fiscal and trade policies may affect a country’s decision 
to defend or abandon a peg.  Eichengreen et al (1994) go as far as to say that speculative attacks 
may occur even in the absence of certain imbalances in policy to stabilize an economy during an 
asymmetric shock. Due to the often endogenous nature of currency crises and planned 
                                                          
11
 Self-fulfilling currency crises are crises caused by investor’s sentiment changes. These crises are caused by poor 
policies in place by governments that make its currencies susceptible to capital flight by investors. Governments 
often have the capability to abandon or defend a currency by manipulating policy, but this only delays a crisis based 
on sentiment. 
12
 Early warning systems in currency crises include trying to isolate variable changes that will help economists 
predict an impending crisis. This study is not trying to isolate trade variables to predict a crisis, but rather show if 
trade is effective in the mitigation of asymmetric shocks. 
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devaluations, using a method to explain exchange rate pressures provides a better understanding 
of the variations in exchange rates caused by specific variables. As a policy measure, this 
supplies central governments with the factors that lead to volatility, not a recipe for deciding 
whether to defend their currency or not, which is based heavily on sentiment and not strictly the 
variables of the model.   
Rose (1994) argues that volatility is hard to identify from the laundry list of monetary, fiscal 
and trade factors, but finds that volatility of pegged exchanged rates varies quite a bit. This study 
provides a new way to investigate currency regimes as a cause of volatility instead of picking 
economic indicators such as interest rates, inflation, etc. as a way to show volatility. Shortly after 
the publication of Rose’s paper, other studies began to look into causes that change sentiment. 
Eichengreen et al (1995) look at the relationship between volatility and political regimes, 
including party turnover. Further into their studies, Eichengreen et al (1996) focus on how 
integrated trade partners experience contagion in exchange rate volatility.
13
 They note the 
important policy implications in relation to providing relief for troubled nations to curtail 
contagion, as well as the implication of regional currency areas that maintain pegs.  
With research refocusing on variables other than monetary policy and capital flows that may 
affect volatility, this paper tries to illustrate how trade openness may affect exchange rate 
movements. The relationship between the two is nothing new, as expressed by Mundell (1961), 
Hau (1999), Auboin and Ruta (2011) and others. Hau (1999) finds statistical evidence that 
exchange rate volatility is determined by the ratio of imports to GDP. Hau (2002) furthers his 
initial paper to find that trade openness is significant in reducing real exchange rate volatility. He 
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 This paper by Eichengreen et. al. bears significant relevance to this research as it shows how common trade 
partners absorb crises from one another. Where economic and trade factors are not completely mobile, countries 
may experience a crisis because one of its trade partners entered into poor fiscal or monetary policies. 
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addresses the reverse causality problem of trade openness and volatility using land size as an 
instrument. However, Hau’s papers recognize that volatility may feed back through monetary 
variables such as money supply and interest rates as well as fiscal variables including output and 
unemployment, and because the macroeconomic variables used to explain this topic are 
endogenous, it is difficult to attribute results to specific policy measures. By using two-stage 
least squares, reverse causality may be mitigated to show the effects of trade on volatility. Hau 
(1999) controls for reverse causality to explain how non-tradable goods and their pass-through 
effect can show how integrated trade reduces exchange rate volatility. He and Romer (1993) use 
land size as an instrumental variable (IV) to control for the reverse causality.
14
 Using an IV is 
consistent with the literature which is starting to revert back to the belief that trade affects 
currency changes. Broda and Romalis (2003) challenge the endogeneity critique using a large 
panel data set, and find that trade leads to lower volatility, and further identify that the effect of 
exchange rate volatility on trade is small. With a doubling of real exchange rate volatility, Broda 
and Romalis observe a decrease in trade of only 2%. Thus, the impact of trade on exchange rate 
volatility is high, but not volatility on trade. Auboin and Ruta (2011) show the relationship 
between trade and volatility may change over time due to the increased hedging capabilities of a 
nation. Their study for the WTO provides an analysis of recent papers on the relationship 
between trade and volatility in which they find positive and negative relationships, as well as, 
significant and insignificant results. 
 This paper uses trade parameters focusing on the summation of imports and exports as a 
percent of GDP to attempt to isolate a causal relationship between trade and exchange market 
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 Land is an exogenous variable that Romer believes affects trade, but not volatility. The purpose of an instrumental 
variable (IV) is to find a factor that affects an independent variable, but not the dependent variable in order to 
control for an endogeniety problem. 
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pressures. Finding a relationship between exchange market pressure and trade may provide a 
policy guideline to moderate the volatility of markets. 
III. The Model 
This paper defines a currency crisis using the Eichengreen et al (1994, 1995) exchange 
market pressure (EMP) model, which shows volatility in exchange rates as a function of changes 
in nominal exchange rates, interest rates and international reserves. The model is a weighted 
index that standardizes the influence of each variable on the EMP by dividing each variable by 
its standard deviation. This alleviates a bias effect of one variable overwhelming the other two. It 
assigns a weight to each variable to ensure the lowest standard deviation of the EMP variable. 
Eichengreen et al created this equation as a way to compare exchange rate pressures across 
countries engaging in devaluations, revaluations or undergoing an attack. The equation for EMP 
is as follows: 
EMPj,t =                                            
In this equation,      represents the nominal exchange rate,      is the interest rate in the 
sample country,       is the interest rate of the control country (in this study, the United States), 
     represents the ratio of international reserves to domestic money (M1) of the sample country 
and       is the ratio of international reserves to M1 of the United States.
15
 The parameters α, β 
and γ are the weights that allocate the different variables to the EMP. Each weight is the inverse 
standard deviation of the variable it modifies. This equation is effective in showing exchange 
rate pressures as it includes the primary endogenous variables that affect crises, not just reserves, 
                                                          
15
 Domestic money (M1) is the total amount of currency and overnight deposits held by households and firms. M1 is 
often used for currency crisis models as this is the domestic currency that is liquid and allows investors to change 
their positions immediately in response to government monetary and fiscal policies, as well as sentiment changes. 
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as is the case in Krugman’s (1979) initial currency crisis model which focuses on capital flight. 
The EMP serves as the dependent variable throughout this model; however, one can also isolate 
specific crises that were witnessed in past economies. Using exchange market pressures allows 
for the model to include any crisis that causes a change in currency levels such as currency crises 
and balance of payment crises. Below is the threshold value created by Eichengreen et al that 
provides a dichotomous variable that signals if a nation is in a crisis: 
                              
When the EMP is above this threshold, the sample economy is experiencing a crisis (Figure 1). 
With the EMP equation above, the framework is now in place to introduce the regressors to 
the model to help explain exchange market pressure variation. Many of the regressors represent 
the monetary and fiscal variables such as national debt, inflation, gross domestic product per 
capita and unemployment that impact currency pressures, but additional variables focus on 
specific trade factors such as trade openness and trade agreements. However, all regressors are 
factors that nations wish to harmonize when entering trade agreements and currency unions to 
reduce asymmetric shocks. 
The EMP equation is widely used as a measure of exchange rate crises; however, it is 
necessary to point out the limitations of the formula. Given that it is determined solely by 
exchange rates, interest rates and international reserves, any variables regressed against the EMP 
includes an endogeneity problem. It is difficult to disentangle whether regressors focusing on the 
state of the economy and trade cause volatility in EMP, or is caused by EMP volatility. This 
paper uses two-stage least squares to address endogeniety. Regional trade agreements is the 
instrumental variable that predicts trade openness, but not EMP.  
14 
 
The models of this paper analyze the explanatory power of different macroeconomic 
variables on exchange market pressures. The models are as follows: 
Specification 1: Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed Effects 
                         
      
      
 
     
         
                       
                                                                 
              
Specification 2: Two-Stage Least Squares 
                         
      
      
 
     
         
                       
                                                         
                           
Specification 3: First Differences 
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Variable Definition Expected Sign 
Inflation 
The increase in general prices 
of goods and services over time 
(+) Signifies expansionary 
monetary policy 
Debt/GDP 
The ratio of government debt to 
gross domestic product 
(+) Increased debt suggests 
that countries have outbound 
cash flows 
 
GDP/Capita 
Gross domestic product per 
person 
(-) Growth of GDP/capita is 
consistent with economic 
stability 
Unemployment Rate 
Ratio of the number 
unemployed to the total labor 
force 
(+) High unemployment is 
consistent with poor economic 
stability 
Trade Openness Index 
Ratio of the sum of imports and 
exports to GDP 
(-) Increased integration 
mitigates volatility 
 
The model argues that common factors as well as trade determine exchange market pressures. 
In previous literature, there is a chasm between empiricists who believe exchange rate volatility 
causes trade movements and the reverse argument. This paper argues trade affects currency 
volatility, thus two-stage least squares uses an instrument to resolve the causality problem. 
Possible instruments include the number of years a country has been in the WTO, its number of 
trade agreements and the land size of the country as used in Romer (1993) and Hau (1999). All 
three instrumental variables influence trade, but not exchange market pressures.  The need for a 
remedial measure such as an instrument is derived from omitted variable bias, such that the error 
term is correlated with the one or more of the regressors. Using instruments provides an unbiased 
estimator that is not correlated with the error term. Additionally, there is a break in the data due 
to the unification of the Euro Zone. All year 1999 data for the sample has been removed to 
accommodate the change in exchange rates from national to Euro for the countries involved. 
16 
 
IV. Data 
The dependent variable (EMP) uses nominal exchange rates relative to USD for the years 
1992 to 2007. OECD data are used for nominal exchange rates as well as 3-month short interest 
rates. International reserves are available only on an annual basis and were obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) database of International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
International reserves create an additional data bias because they are reported from the central 
banks of respective nations. For the purpose of this paper, stated reserves are taken at their true 
value, despite possible central bank manipulations to show stronger positions than reality. Less 
transparent governments are more notorious for providing unreliable international reserve data in 
order to maintain sentiment on current currency rates. M1 data are also taken from the IFS as 
well as the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), when unavailable in the IFS database.  
This paper uses panel data to show the exchange market pressures of 20 OECD nations over 
a 15 year period (1992-2007, less 1999). 1999 is omitted for all countries due to the formation of 
the Euro Zone which restructured exchange rates for participating nations.  All OECD nations 
inducted into the organization before 1996 are used in the research with the exception of the 
United States (the reference nation for exchange rates, interest rates and international reserves). 
Finland, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg are not included due to missing money values in the 
IFS database.  
Panel data are used to better control for fixed and time effects inherent in the dynamic growth 
of the selected countries during the 15 year period.  Furthermore, panel data adds degrees of 
freedom and variability to mitigate auto correlation. International reserves, an integral variable in 
17 
 
determining crises, is available on a yearly basis only, thus all data collected for this paper is 
shown annually. 
The majority of the data for the regressors are derived from the OECD database. Debt to 
gross domestic product is primarily found on the OECD database, with missing data received 
from the Reinhart and Rogoff debt/GDP database. Inflation is the consumer price annual 
percentage change, also from the OECD database. GDP per capita from the OECD is in constant 
prices and constant PPPs in US dollars. Harmonized unemployment percentage is provided by 
the OECD, with missing data found on the World Bank’s Database. Regional trade agreements 
(RTA) are aggregated totals from the WTO’s RTA database. The trade openness index is from 
the United Nation’s UNCTADstat Database, and here is defined as the sum of imports and 
exports (roughly the size of international trade) as a percent of GDP. All data points for the 20 
nations over the 15 year period are complete and consistent. 
V. Empirical Estimation 
This paper estimates the effect of inflation, debt to gross domestic product, gross domestic 
product per capita, unemployment rate and trade openness on economic volatility. The 
motivation of the paper is to demonstrate how the growth in trade in the past quarter century 
impacts the ability of countries to lessen volatility as measured by the exchange market pressure 
technique. Due to the presence of multicollinearity and reverse causality, this paper uses three 
different techniques to identify the effect of trade on volatility. The first model uses ordinary 
least squares with fixed effects to determine an initial relationship. Second, two-stage least 
squares is used to acquire an instrument to control for reverse causality between trade openness 
and volatility. This paper posits that trade influences volatility, but because the sample is 
18 
 
stretched over 15 years, volatility could affect trade as well. Last, 1
st
 differences are used to 
remove mulitcollinearity between regressors.  
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics for the exchange market pressures of each nation. 
The exchange market pressure is the measure of economic volatility derived from changes in 
nominal exchange rates, interest rates and international reserves. A positive EMP signifies a 
more volatile economy on average over the time frame analyzed. A higher standard deviation 
shows a greater dispersion of volatility over the time series. The mean EMP for the OECD 
nations analyzed is slightly negative, which is expected as the central tendency of volatility over 
the time frame exhibits periods of both economic prosperity and deficiency. Mexico, Portugal 
and Spain experienced the highest EMP average over the time series. Mexico also encountered 
the largest EMP value of any year during its 1995 crisis of .58 compared to a mean of .056 over 
the 15 year period. The threshold crisis value is measured by taking the mean EMP for a specific 
country and adding 1.5 times its standard deviation. Once a nation crosses this threshold due to a 
high EMP for an individual year, it is said to be in a crisis. Figure 1 provides an example using 
Mexico to determine when a nation is considered in crisis. The data correctly corroborates crises 
with results actually seen during the time period analyzed, such as Mexico in 1995, the Asian 
Tigers in 1997 and other nations in 2001. In total, the time series produced 18 crises.  
The descriptive statistics in table 2 evaluate the aggregate levels for the regressors of OECD 
nations over the 15 year time period. Inflation levels are stable at just below 3%, with the 
extreme inflation level represented by Mexico during its 1995 crisis at about 35%. Debt levels 
averaged 48.9% of GDP for the sample nations, with Australia exhibiting the lowest at around 5% 
in 2007 and Japan the highest at 165% in 2007. The unemployment rate averaged 6.6% over the 
time period, with the highest spell at 21.3% for Spain in 1994. The trade openness index, 
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measured by the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP, is 34.5% with the lowest 
openness for Japan in 1993, who also engaged in zero trade agreements at the time, and Belgium 
in 2000 with the highest. All nations display a positive trend in trade openness over the span of 
the data, signifying an increase in trade interactions in the past 15 years, with some nations such 
as Japan engaging in regional trade agreements for the first time. 
Table 3 first looks at how the regressors impact exchange market pressures using ordinary 
least squares, with fixed effects. The initial year, 1992, is the omitted year out of convenience, 
while Canada is the omitted nation because it possesses a near mean zero exchange market 
pressure and the smallest EMP standard deviation in the dataset. 1999 is omitted for all 
specifications due to the formation of the Euro Zone which restructured exchange rates for 
participating nations.  All regressors use data on an annual basis. Table 3 shows that inflation is 
significant in explaining volatility. This coincides with economic intuition, as parity suggests that 
increased inflation would translate into higher interest rates and exchange rates, which are both 
inputs of the exchange market pressure variable. This mechanism is best explained by the Fisher 
Effect, developed by Irving Fisher (1930), which argues that to maintain parity, a rise in 
expected inflation, causes a rise in expected interest rates. Interest rates are a key input in the 
EMP, so it is predictable that the two variables move together. The results show a 1% increase in 
inflation will raise the EMP by .013 units which may seem insignificant, but during a time of 
global volatility, it has the potential to push a nation towards or across its crisis threshold level. 
As noted before, Mexico saw inflation levels of about 35% in 1995. Eichengreen et al (1995) 
found a similar strong relationship between higher inflation and ensuing crises. Controlling for 
other regressors, gross domestic product per capita is significant and negative in impacting 
volatility. This makes intuitive sense, as a more prosperous nation would ideally exhibit better 
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financial hedging capabilities and access to financial markets to lessen peaks and troughs in 
business cycles.  
Using OLS shows that the years 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2007 are significantly positive 
in affecting EMP. The results mirror other studies that show 1997 and 2001 as volatile years. 
Furthermore, an investigation of each nation’s EMP against a crisis threshold value ascribed to 
individual nations based on the standard deviation of their EMP shows that 4 nations experienced 
a crisis in 2001 and 8 in 1997. The magnitude of the coefficients are .201 and .179 respectively. 
The crisis in 1997 was largely felt by Asian Tigers and the resulting contagion, while 2001crises 
resulted from a stock market recession and 9/11. This shows that exchange market pressures are 
largely influenced by systematic risks felt on a global level. Much like a well diversified 
financial portfolio, it is possible to reduce idiosyncratic risks, but volatility is still largely 
determined by the variance of the global economy. Although, poor monetary policies have the 
potential to produce idiosyncratic risks that can move one nation into crises despite stable 
conditions elsewhere. This is part of the theory behind why trade is expected to reduce volatility. 
Increasing trade partners and the movement of goods and services should in practice diversify a 
nation’s assets, reducing idiosyncratic risks. Much like Mundell’s (1961) theory, if factors of 
production are allocated correctly, individual crises are removed from the economy in place of 
symmetrical shocks. 
Country effects display results that prove counter intuitive to expectations, such as a negative 
coefficient for Mexico and Korea. These two nations exhibit a higher mean EMP than the 
majority of nations, as well as experienced crises. However, conditional on all other regressors 
that are likely to impact volatility, country effects may not play a significant part in determining 
the lessening or intensification of business cycle volatility.  
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Another specification within the first table is a logit approach to determine whether the 
characteristics of the regressors impact a country to cross the crisis threshold as defined by the 
model. Many of the regressors cause the EMP to move subtly, but the purpose of the logit is to 
see whether a regressor is explanatory in causing major changes in the EMP, such that a country 
is in crisis. The results illustrate that inflation is significant in causing a country to go from not in 
crisis to crisis, conditional on other factors. Furthermore, the unemployment rate is positive and 
almost significant in prompting a similar result. The regressors that aid in preventing a crisis are 
trade openness, GDP per capita and surprisingly debt to GDP, which may be because OECD 
nations with larger debts may be incurring it at a lower interest rate because they are fiscally 
strong nations. The logit results use the dichotomous threshold variable to show not was causes 
minor fluctuations in EMP, but large changes in EMP that can move a country towards crisis. 
OLS provides a cursory overview of the impact of the regressors on volatility. The main 
motivator for this paper is the impact of trade on volatility, which is not a strong indicator of 
EMP according to the OLS technique. 
The next regression uses two-stage least squares, which is used to find an instrumental 
variable to correct for reverse causality. Research on trade and its impact on volatility recognize 
the chance that a regression technique may pick up on the impact of volatility on trade over a 
time series and not the other way around. Therefore, this paper uses a nation’s total regional 
trade agreements as an instrument that will predict trade openness but not exchange market 
pressures. Past research such as Hau (1999) and Romer (1993) used land size as an instrument, 
but the time series nature of this research requires an instrument that is dynamic such as trade 
agreements. Table 4 provides the first and second stage regressions of a fixed effect, two-stage 
least squares technique. The first equation exhibits an R square of .97, which is quite high for an 
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instrument. However, the availability to find a macroeconomic instrument that is correlated with 
trade openness, but not volatility at a more reasonable correlation is difficult. Thus, trade 
agreements are used despite its high correlation. Once corrected with a trade openness estimator, 
the results change slightly from the first specification of OLS.  
Inflation is again significant and positive in predicting volatility. Just a one percent increase 
in inflation increases EMP by .011. Therefore, a country like Mexico who has an average EMP 
around .05 with a standard deviation of  about .17 will likely flirt with a crisis during a period of 
poor monetary policies. Thus, a crisis may be self-fulfilling in that one poor policy leads to 
implications that permeate other variables, ultimately worsening volatility. GDP per capita is 
once again negative and significant, meaning that controlling for all other regressors, an increase 
in a nation’s wealth will reduce volatility. This technique provides a positive significance in the 
year 1997, consistent with the OLS method as well as volatility observed during that time 
periods. The coefficient is .116 for 1997. By controlling for year effects, this paper shows that 
volatility is largely systematic. Thus, some policy measures may alleviate pressures, but 
ultimately, a crisis may be attributable to global market conditions. 
The purpose of using two-stage least squares is to correct for reverse causality between trade 
openness and exchange market pressures. The instrument of trade agreements provides a weak 
correction, yet demonstrates an interesting change in results. Trade openness is now nearly 
significant and positive. This is contrary to the hypothesis of the paper, and may be attributable 
to a weak instrument. However, part of the motivation for this paper lay in the peculiar increase 
in volatility in nations such as Mexico, South Korea and Japan after they increased trade 
openness. A positive and nearly significant result is consistent with some papers in the past 
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decade according to Auboin and Ruta (2011). The main difficulty in this line of research is 
identifying a proper instrument to provide more stable results.  
The third table shows a specification that tries to correct for the endogeniety and collinearity 
problems alike through first differences. In doing so, the year 1993 is dropped as a dummy 
variable as well as Canada as the omitted country. Furthermore, time and country effects are 
included to pick up on any other explanatory inputs that could affect EMP. The results show 
similar findings in inflation, both positive and significant, which is expected for price level and 
interest rate parity to hold. The main difference is seen in trade openness, where the regressor is 
now negative and significant at the 5% level, confirming the paper’s hypothesis. The results 
illustrate that a one unit increase in trade openness, or the ratio of imports and exports to GDP, 
results in a .004 decline in EMP. This is a robust result, given that many nations saw large 
increases in trade openness and a subsequent fall in EMP year-over-year. Large increases in 
openness are seen by European Union participants who entered into trade agreements en masse. 
Furthermore, as nations continue to liberalize, their openness index rapidly increases. The rest of 
the results for the final specification demonstrates significance in year effects, consistent with the 
idea that systematic risks plays a large role in volatility. Fixed effects for year 1997, display a 
positive and significant result with an increase in EMP conditional on other regressors of .198.  
This alone is above the crisis threshold for many nations, which is consistent with 8 of the 20 
nations sampled experiencing a crisis according to the EMP threshold during that year.  
Adding countries in fixed effects may appear redundant when performing first differences, 
but the purpose remains to illustrate how specific country policies can influence EMP depending 
on their effectiveness. Thus, table 5 also shows first differences without country effects. The 
signs of the regressors stay the same with the exception of GDP per capita and debt to GDP, 
24 
 
which are so close to zero that it is inconsequential. Inflation remains significant and positive, 
but without country effects, trade openness is no longer significant. However, the coefficient 
remains nearly the same at a -.003 decrease in EMP for a one unit increase in trade openness. 
This suggests that first differences with country effects are satisfactory in explaining changes in 
EMP, while allowing analysis of how idiosyncratic policies of a country affect its volatility. 
VI. Conclusion 
The analysis suggests that exchange market pressures witnessed by OECD nations in the 15 
year time frame are largely influenced by inflation rates. This intuitively makes sense due to 
parities between interest rates, an input of the EMP equation, and inflation as explained by the 
Fisher Effect. The findings also corroborate true events that occurred in 1997 and 2001 that 
illustrate volatility. Year effect’s significant impact on EMP suggests that volatility is rooted in 
systematic risk in the global economy, and not necessarily based on idiosyncratic monetary 
policies by the countries who encounter crises.  With that said, certain nations exhibit higher 
mean EMP’s, which may be attributable to poor decisions in terms of fighting off potential 
currency crises. Eichengreen et al (1995) note the relevance of high inflation in predicting crises, 
but are quick to acknowledge unpredictable, unavoidable factors also assist in volatility.  
The final regression illustrates that trade causes a negative and significant impact in 
determining EMP. This is an important finding as it suggests that the World Trade Organization 
correctly promotes countries to globalize as a way to mitigate volatility. Many instances 
throughout the dataset illustrate significant increases in trade openness, accompanied by declines 
in year-over-year exchange market pressures. Such results suggest that countries that increase 
their trade portfolio may decrease volatility. 
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The findings match the main premise behind the work of Mundell (1961), where he suggests 
integration via trade or an optimum currency area (such as the Euro Zone) will reduce volatility 
by correctly allocating goods and services to specific countries based on need. Each country in 
the sample continues to see an upward trend in trade openness which may also assist in the 
reduction of volatility as it opens up financial markets and hedging capabilities. Access to trade 
provides a way for countries to perform consumption smoothing to lessen business cycles. 
Furthermore, it better aligns monetary policies between nations, which should further reduce 
idiosyncratic risks. However, consistent monetary policies remove the ability of a nation to carry 
out individual monetary policies in times of volatility. Thus, for unification to be successful, 
integrated countries must assure factors of production can move freely and as needed between 
nations. 
Despite a time frame of increasing trade openness, the nations included in the dataset 
experiences a total of 18 crises. Even if measures are taken to reduce volatility, such as increased 
trade relationships, there will still be a recurrence of crises, even among prosperous nations such 
as those included in the OECD. Thus, past models showing second generation crises based on 
sentiment changes may still provide the best insight into why crises occur. A country may 
experience poor monetary policies at a time where systematic risks in the global economy persist, 
causing an ultimate loss in confidence in a nation with just slightly poorer economic models. At 
this point, investors will move their position and the country’s currency will devalue. As the 
threshold values show, some years illustrated higher EMP’s for all nations. If this is coupled with 
even a slight mismanagement of inflation or debt, a nation could quickly fall into a crisis. 
This papers reinforces the policy implications established between countries in the past 
quarter century. Increasing trade partners may aid in reducing volatility, by correctly allocating 
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goods and services, as well as providing a wider reach of financial markets. Nations looking to 
strengthen their economies can also engage in currency unions as evident by the Euro Zone in 
order to take advantage of increased trade and creating policy symmetries to curtail cycles. 
Nations should continue to take part in Trade Round Tables to better bridge the operations and 
policies between each other to reduce idiosyncratic risks that may lead to economic volatility. If 
done correctly, countries may only be subject to the systematic risks that are felt globally. 
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Summary Statistics 
Table 1: Exchange Market Pressures 
Country Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Crisis 
Threshold 
OECD Sample -0.00649 -0.33522 0.57739 0.02626 0.17378 
Australia 0.01477 -0.16882 0.29794 0.12007 0.19488 
Austria -0.00349 -0.24450 0.18424 0.11685 0.17179 
Belgium -0.01665 -0.25606 0.20077 0.11348 0.15357 
Canada -0.01014 -0.15322 0.09986 0.07707 0.10546 
Denmark -0.04019 -0.27912 0.15924 0.11110 0.12647 
France -0.03660 -0.16412 0.11240 0.10111 0.11507 
Germany -0.00262 -0.22915 0.17115 0.11373 0.16798 
Iceland 0.01912 -0.17183 0.21880 0.11830 0.19658 
Italy -0.00882 -0.24962 0.15809 0.10197 0.14415 
Japan -0.06143 -0.28612 0.11639 0.11713 0.11427 
Korea -0.02268 -0.33522 0.22316 0.15544 0.21048 
Mexico 0.05629 -0.09559 0.57739 0.17539 0.31937 
Netherlands -0.02812 -0.25551 0.15286 0.13181 0.16960 
New Zealand -0.00528 -0.19591 0.42728 0.16415 0.24094 
Norway -0.00504 -0.13851 0.29327 0.11563 0.16841 
Portugal 0.02350 -0.25365 0.17074 0.10045 0.17417 
Spain 0.01617 -0.30789 0.36683 0.16776 0.26781 
Sweden 0.00674 -0.16996 0.10172 0.08988 0.14156 
Switzerland -0.00465 -0.19258 0.16939 0.10506 0.15294 
United 
Kingdom 
-0.02061 -0.27907 0.14932 0.10711 0.14005 
 
Table 2: Regressors 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Inflation 2.81 -0.90 34.99 3.41 
Debt/GDP 48.95 5.18 164.55 30.13 
GDP/Capita 27884 9913 49208 6988 
Unemployment 
Rate % 
6.56 2.06 21.33 3.17 
Regional Trade 
Agreements 
14.9 0 32 9.8 
Trade Openness 
Index 
34.46 8.22 89.92 14.20 
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Table 3: Ordinary least squares, with fixed effects 
 
  
 Coefficient Significance Logit Significance 
Constant .437 
(.206) 
** -52.012 
(5166.244) 
 
Inflation .013 
(.003) 
*** 1.093 
(.440) 
** 
Debt / GDP -.001 
(.001) 
 -.396 
(.203) 
* 
GDP / Capita -.0000168 
(.000) 
* -.002 
(.001) 
* 
Unemployment 
Rate 
.003 
(.005) 
 1.443 
(.901) 
 
Trade Openness -.00049 
(.002) 
 -.355 
(.301) 
 
Year 2007 .141 
(.071) 
** No Crises  
Year 2006 .109 
(.067) 
 23.688 
(10635.48) 
 
Year 2005 .012 
(.062) 
 21.882 
(11018.99) 
 
Year 2004 .086 
(.058) 
 20.821 
(11233.33) 
 
Year 2003 .071 
(.053) 
 No Crises  
Year 2002 .161 
(.053) 
*** 40.260 
(5165.98) 
 
Year 2001 .201 
(.053) 
*** 42.857 
(5165.98) 
 
Year 2000 .143 
(.053) 
*** No Crises  
Year 1998 .066 
(.043) 
 10.114 
(10332.87) 
 
Year 1997 .179 
(.040) 
*** 37.326 
(5165.98) 
 
Year 1996 -.010 
(.037) 
 No Crises  
Year 1995 -.040 
(.035) 
 27.617 
(5165.98) 
 
Year 1994 .036 
(.035) 
 23.995 
(5165.98) 
 
Year 1993 -.015 
(.034) 
 No Crises  
Australia -.006 
(.058) 
 -19.436 
(10.298) 
* 
Austria .017 
(.051) 
 10.608 
(6.205) 
* 
Belgium .026 
(.101) 
 33.553 
(17.850) 
* 
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Denmark 
 
-.012 
(.045) 
  
No Crises 
 
France -.092 
(.052) 
* No Crises  
Germany -.033 
(.043) 
 -14.308 
(9.128) 
 
Iceland -.014 
(.044) 
 -3.658 
(4.551) 
 
Italy -.047 
(.059) 
 No Crises  
Japan .029 
(.077) 
 11.840 
(10.058) 
 
Korea -.319 
(.103) 
*** -41.367 
(23.145) 
* 
Mexico -.404 
(.153) 
*** -75.456 
(35.327) 
** 
Netherlands .027 
(.070) 
 No Crises  
New Zealand -.154 
(.074) 
** -26.567 
(15.544) 
* 
Norway .203 
(.077) 
*** 24.052 
(15.130) 
 
Portugal -.162 
(.087) 
* No Crises  
Spain -.146 
(.070) 
** No Crises  
Sweden -.027 
(.044) 
 -.975 
(4.022) 
 
Switzerland .097 
(.052) 
* 10.850 
(6.485) 
* 
United Kingdom -.044 
(.047) 
 -8.252 
(6.017) 
 
R-Square .368  McFadden: .692  
    
Notes: *** (**,*) indicates statistically different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
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Table 4: Two stage least squares to correct for causality problem 
 
 1
st
 Stage Significance 2
nd
 Stage Significance 
Constant 27.104 
(5.071) 
*** .136 
(.272) 
*** 
Inflation .245 
(.068) 
*** .011 
(.003) 
*** 
Debt / GDP -.001 
(.015) 
 -.001 
(.001) 
 
GDP / Capita -.0000359 
(.000) 
 -.00001553 
(.000) 
** 
Unemployment Rate .558 
(.128) 
*** -.004 
(.007) 
 
Trade Openness - 
Estimator 
  .010 
(.006) 
 
Trade Agreements .408 
(.065) 
***   
Year 2007 7.466 
(1.973) 
*** -.013 
(.113) 
 
Year 2006 6.858 
(.1.855) 
*** -.034 
(.106) 
 
Year 2005 5.102 
(1.748) 
*** -.107 
(.093) 
 
Year 2004 4.087 
(1.649) 
** -.018 
(.084) 
 
Year 2003 2.815 
(1.547) 
* -.016 
(.074) 
 
Year 2002 4.404 
(1.491) 
*** .060 
(.079) 
 
Year 2001 6.832 
(1.395) 
*** .082 
(.086) 
 
Year 2000 8.145 
(1.301) 
*** .019 
(.088) 
 
Year 1998 4.274 
(1.132) 
*** -.009 
(.062) 
 
Year 1997 3.243 
(1.069) 
*** .116 
(.055) 
** 
Year 1996 1.789 
(.972) 
* -.048 
(.044) 
 
Year 1995 1.602 
(.921) 
* -.071 
(.041) 
* 
Year 1994 .862 
(.894) 
 .022 
(.037) 
 
Year 1993 -.481 
(.870) 
 -.011 
(.035) 
 
Australia -17.277 
(1.092) 
*** -.183 
(.121) 
 
Austria 2.850 
(1.680) 
* -.094 
(.082) 
 
Belgium 29.737 
(1.970) 
*** -.395 
(.256) 
 
31 
 
Denmark -2.678 
(1.747) 
 -.075 
(.058) 
 
France -20.167 
(1.685) 
*** .042 
(.093) 
 
Germany -13.314 
(1.602) 
*** .029 
(.056) 
 
Iceland -2.140 
(1.263) 
* -.027 
(.047) 
 
Italy -20.561 
(1.998) 
*** .077 
(.092) 
 
Japan -21.248 
(1.632) 
*** .248 
(.146) 
* 
Korea -.983 
(2.664) 
 -.302 
(.108) 
*** 
Mexico -14.296 
(3.884) 
*** -.268 
(.176) 
 
Netherlands 16.502 
(1.758) 
*** -.244 
(.167) 
 
New Zealand -6.094 
(1.876) 
*** -.081 
(.087) 
 
Norway -1.267 
(2.113) 
 .169 
(.083) 
** 
Portugal -10.953 
(2.482) 
*** -.118 
(.094) 
 
Spain -21.290 
(1.865) 
*** .017 
(.116) 
 
Sweden -4.385 
(1.578) 
*** -055 
(.048) 
 
Switzerland 7.074 
(1.312) 
*** -.016 
(.083) 
 
United Kingdom -15.960 
(1.639) 
*** .042 
(.069) 
 
R-Square .968  .352  
    
Notes: *** (**,*) indicates statistically different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
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Table 5: First differences specification 
 
   
 Coefficient Significance Without 
Country Effects 
Significance  
Constant -.026 
(.043) 
 -.020 
(.033) 
  
Inflation Difference .021 
(.004) 
*** .016 
(.004) 
***  
Debt / GDP Difference -.000104 
(.001) 
 .001 
(.002) 
  
GDP / Capita Difference .00000428 
(.000) 
 -.00001211 
(.000) 
  
Unemployment Rate Difference -.004 
(.008) 
 -.003 
(.012) 
  
Trade Openness Difference -.004 
(.002) 
** -.003 
(.004) 
  
Year 2007 .030 
(.040) 
 .052 
(.044) 
  
Year 2006 .096 
(.040) 
** .118 
(.045) 
***  
Year 2005 -.071 
(.040) 
* -.053 
(.043) 
  
Year 2004 .019 
(.040) 
 .036 
(.043) 
  
Year 2003 -.082 
(.039) 
** -.070 
(.042) 
*  
Year 2002 -.032 
(.039) 
 -.022 
(.042) 
  
Year 2001 .059 
(.040) 
 .075 
(.043) 
*  
Year 2000 .056 
(.043) 
 .095 
(.054) 
*  
Year 1998 -.111 
(.040) 
*** -.093 
(.044) 
  
Year 1997 .198 
(.040) 
*** .214 
(.045) 
***  
Year 1996 .037 
(.040) 
 .051 
(.042) 
  
Year 1995 -.085 
(.041) 
** -.064 
(.044) 
  
Year 1994 .059 
(.040) 
 .070 
(.043) 
  
Australia .010 
(.050) 
    
Austria .007 
(.050) 
    
Belgium .026 
(.050) 
    
Denmark .029 
(.050) 
    
France .005     
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(.049) 
Germany .018 
(.050) 
    
Iceland .011 
(.049) 
    
Italy .016 
(.050) 
    
Japan .015 
(.050) 
    
Korea -.043 
(.050) 
    
Mexico .073 
(.049) 
    
Netherlands .025 
(.050) 
    
New Zealand -.003 
(.049) 
    
Norway .029 
(.049) 
    
Portugal .018 
(.050) 
    
Spain .004 
(.049) 
    
Sweden .016 
(.050) 
    
Switzerland .015 
(.049) 
    
United Kingdom .001 
(.049) 
    
R-Square .336  .313   
      
Notes: *** (**, *) indicates statistically different from zero at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. 
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Figure 1: Mexico’s EMP 
 
The figure above shows the movement in exchange market pressures over time for Mexico. The 
crisis threshold uses the referred to equation by Eichengreen et al (1994). When EMP crosses the 
crisis threshold, that particular country is said to be undergoing a currency crisis. In this case, it 
was devaluation in 1995. 
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